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Abstract. Nowadays, the resistance against algebraic attacks and fast
algebraic attacks are considered as an important cryptographic property
for Boolean functions used in stream ciphers. Both attacks are very pow-
erful analysis concepts and can be applied to symmetric cryptographic
algorithms used in stream ciphers. The notion of algebraic immunity has
received wide attention since it is a powerful tool to measure the resis-
tance of a Boolean function to standard algebraic attacks. Nevertheless,
an algebraic tool to handle the resistance to fast algebraic attacks is not
clearly identified in the literature. In the current paper, we propose a new
parameter to measure the resistance of a Boolean function to fast alge-
braic attack. We also introduce the notion of fast immunity profile and
show that it informs both on the resistance to standard and fast algebraic
attacks. Further, we evaluate our parameter for two secondary construc-
tions of Boolean functions. Moreover, A coding-theory approach to the
characterization of perfect algebraic immune functions is presented. Via
this characterization, infinite families of binary linear complementary
dual codes (or LCD codes for short) are obtained from perfect algebraic
immune functions. The binary LCD codes presented in this paper have
applications in armoring implementations against so-called side-channel
attacks (SCA) and fault non-invasive attacks, in addition to their appli-
cations in communication and data storage systems.
Keywords Boolean function · (Fast) Algebraic immunity · Algebraic attack
· Fast algebraic attack · Reed-Muller code · LCD code · Side-channel attack ·
Fault injection attack.
1 Introduction
Boolean functions have important applications in the combiner model and the
filter model of stream ciphers. A function used in such an application should
mainly possess balancedness, a high algebraic degree, a high nonlinearity and,
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in the case of the combiner model, a high correlation immunity. In 2003, new
kinds of attacks drawn from an original idea of Shannon [37] emerged; these
attacks are called algebraic attacks and fast algebraic attacks [14,15,33]. Since
2003, the designers of cryptosystems in symmetric cryptography need also to
ensure resistance to the algebraic attack (they need in practice optimal or al-
most optimal algebraic immunity) and good resistance to fast algebraic attacks
and to the Rønjom-Helleseth attack [20,22], and its improvements. A first nice
primary construction of an infinite class of functions satisfying all the crypto-
graphic criteria (balancedness, the algebraic degree the algebraic immunity and
the non-linearity) is the so-called Carlet-Feng construction [5]. Note that its
good resistance to fast algebraic attacks has first been checked by computer for
n ≤ 12, using an algorithm from [1], and later shown mathematically in [26] for
all n. Later, classes of functions have been proposed in the literature in which
the authors suggested some modifications of the Carlet-Feng functions and other
constructions (see for instance [3,12] and the references therein).
(Fast-) algebraic attacks have changed the situation in symmetric cryptogra-
phy for the steam ciphers by adding a new criterion of considerable importance
to the above list. They proceed by modeling the problem of recovering the se-
cret key through an over-defined system of multivariate nonlinear equations of
algebraic degree at most deg(f). The core of algebraic attacks is to find out low
degree Boolean functions g 6= 0 and h such that fg = h. It is shown in [33] that
this is equivalent to the existence of low algebraic degree annihilators of f , that
is, of n-variable Boolean functions g such that f · g = 0 or (1 + f) · g = 0. The
minimum degree of such g is called the algebraic immunity of f , and we denote
it by AI(f). It must be as high as possible (the optimum value of AI(f) being
equal to
⌈
n
2
⌉
). In 2020, a novel application of Boolean functions with high alge-
braic immunity in minimal codes has been derived in [13]. Fast algebraic attacks
proceed differently and exploit the existence of function g of small degree such
that the degree of f · g is not too large. Many authors have indicated that hav-
ing a high algebraic immunity is not only a necessary condition for resistance
to standard algebraic attacks but also for resistance to fast algebraic attacks.
Nevertheless, having a high algebraic immunity may not be sufficient in the de-
sign of pseudo-random generators using a Boolean function as filter or combiner
(see [2]). That motivates to define a new parameter to measure the resistance of
the Boolean function f used in such generators to fast algebraic attacks. Such
a parameter has been proposed in [12,17,25]. Very recently, Me´aux has studied
in [31,32] the fast algebraic immunity of interesting families of cryptographic
Boolean functions, namely the so-called majority functions (which have been
intensively studied in the area of cryptography, because of their practical advan-
tages and good properties), and Threshold functions (which are a sub-family of
symmetric Boolean functions, which means that the output is independent of the
order of the input binary variables). In 2020, Tang [38] has derived a relation
on the fast algebraic immunity between a Boolean function and its modifica-
tions, by introducing a new concept called partial fast algebraic immunity. As
applications of this relation, he derived some upper bounds on the fast algebraic
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immunity of several known classes of modified majority functions with optimal
algebraic immunity. These bounds show that these modified majority functions
still have low fast algebraic immunity, which is coincident with the relation. A
very nice reference on this topic is the excellent book of Carlet [4] (which will
appear soon).
In this paper, we provide for the first time a link between fast algebraic im-
mune Boolean functions and the so-called linear complementary dual code (ab-
breviated LCD). An LCD code is defined as a linear code C whose (Euclidean)
dual code C⊥ satisfies C ∩ C⊥ = {0}. LCD codes have been widely applied in
data storage, communications systems, consumer electronics, and cryptography.
In [30], Massey showed that LCD codes provide an optimum linear coding so-
lution for the two-user binary adder channel. In 2014, Carlet and Guilley [6]
investigated an interesting application of binary LCD codes against side-channel
attacks (SCA) and fault injection attacks (FIA) and presented several construc-
tions of LCD codes. It was shown non-binary LCD codes in characteristic 2 can
be transformed into binary LCD codes by expansion. It is then important to keep
in mind that, for SCA, the most interesting case is when the code is defined over
an alphabet of size q with q even. The recent literature is abundant about LCD
codes. One of the most important results on the classification of LCD codes is
that any linear code over Fq (q > 3) is equivalent to an (Euclidean) LCD code
[11]. A complete state-of-the-art on LCD codes can be found in the recent article
[7] and the references therein.
This paper is organized as follows. In Subsection 3.1, we modify the param-
eter proposed in [17,25] so that it does not depend on the algebraic immunity
as in [17,25] that we denote by FAI(f). We show that the value of the modified
parameter is less or equal to the one proposed in [17] and [25] for every Boolean
function. In Subsection 3.2, we introduce the notion of the immunity profile of a
Boolean function and show that both the algebraic immunity and the FAI of a
Boolean function can be deduced from this immunity profile. In Subsection 4.1,
we show that if a function is at low Hamming distance from a low algebraic de-
gree function, then it is weak against fast algebraic attacks and we study further
the behavior of FAI. In Subsection 4.2, we study the FAI of a classical sec-
ondary construction of Boolean function, which it called concatenation Boolean
function. We prove that the FAI of the concatenation of the Boolean function
can be bounded from below and above by the FAI of its sub-functions. Finally,
in Section 5 we present a coding-theory characterization of perfect algebraic im-
mune Boolean functions by means of the LCD-ness of punctured Reed-Muller
codes and derive some new infinite families of LCD codes.
2 Preliminaries and notation
In this section, we give a brief introduction to algebraic immunity, Reed-Muller
codes and linear complementary dual codes, which are the foundations of other
sections.
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2.1 Algebraic immunity of Boolean functions
Let n be any positive integer. In this paper, we shall denote by Bn the set of all
n-variable Boolean functions over Fn2 . Any n-variable Boolean function f (that
is a mapping from Fn2 to F2) admits a unique algebraic normal form (ANF), that
is, a representation as a multivariate polynomial over F2
f(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
I⊆{1,...,n}
aI
∏
i∈I
xi,
where the aI ’s are in F2. The terms
∏
i∈I xi are called monomials. The algebraic
degree deg(f) of a Boolean function f equals the maximum degree of those
monomials whose coefficients are nonzero in its algebraic normal form.
If we identify Fn2 with the Galois field F2n of order 2
n, Boolean functions
of n-variables are then the binary functions over the Galois field F2n (one can
always endow this vector space with the structure of a field, thanks to the choice
of a basis of F2n over F2) of order 2
n. The support of f , denoted by supp(f),
is the set of elements of F2n whose image under f is 1, that is, supp(f) =
{x ∈ F2n : f(x) = 1}. The weight of f , denoted by wt(f), is the Hamming weight
of the image vector of f , that is, the cardinality of its support supp(f) := {x ∈
F2n | f(x) = 1}.
For any positive integer k, and r dividing k, the trace function from F2k
to F2r , denoted by Tr
k
r , is the mapping defined as: ∀x ∈ F2k , T rkr (x) :=∑ k
r
−1
i=0 x
2ir . In particular, we denote the absolute trace over F2 of an element
x ∈ F2n by Trn1 (x) =
∑n−1
i=0 x
2i . Every non-zero Boolean function f defined on
F2n has a (unique) trace expansion of the form:
∀x ∈ F2n , f(x) =
∑
j∈Γn
Tr
o(j)
1 (ajx
j) + ǫ(1 + x2
n−1)
called its polynomial form, where Γn is the set of integers obtained by choosing
one element in each cyclotomic class of 2 modulo 2n − 1, o(j) is the size of the
cyclotomic coset of 2 modulo 2n − 1 containing j, aj ∈ F2o(j) and, ǫ = wt(f)
modulo 2. The algebraic degree of f is equal to the maximum 2-weight of an
exponent j for which aj 6= 0 if ǫ = 0 and to n if ǫ = 1. We recall that the
2-weight of an exponent j, that we denote by w2(j), is the number of 1 in its
binary expansion.
An n-variable Boolean function g is said to be an annihilator of an n-variable
Boolean function f if f · g = 0, where f · g is the Boolean function whose
output equals the product in F2 of the outputs of f and g. The set of all non-
zero annihilators of a Boolean function f shall be denoted by AN(f). We shall
denote by AN c(f) the complement of the set AN(f), that is, the set of n-
variable Boolean function f such that f · g 6= 0. We shall denote by LDA(f)
the minimum degree of non-zero annihilators of f [33]. The algebraic immunity
AI(f) of f is the minimum value between LDA(f) and LDA(1+ f). Obviously,
for a Boolean function f , we have AI(1 + f) = AI(f). In addition, algebraic
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immunity is invariant under affine transformations. More specifically, if f is
an n-variable Boolean function and A is an affine automorphism of Fn2 then,
AI(f) = AI(f ◦A).
2.2 Linear codes and Reed-Muller codes
An [ℓ, k] code C over the finite field Fq is a linear subspace of Fℓq with dimension
k. For convenience, we will denote by dimFq (C) the dimension of the code C.
The dual code, denoted by C⊥, of C is a linear code with dimension ℓ− k and is
defined by
C⊥ =
{
(wi)
ℓ
i=1 ∈ Fℓq :
c1w1 + · · ·+ cℓwℓ = 0
for all (c1, · · · , cℓ) ∈ C
}
.
Puncturing and shortening are classical techniques used to obtain codes of
length less than ℓ from mother codes having length ℓ, thus decreasing the length
of codes. These constructions will be useful for understanding fast algebraic
immunity. Given an [ℓ, k] code C, we can puncture it by deleting the same coor-
dinate i in each codeword. The resulting code is denoted by C{i}. For any set D
of coordinates in C, we use CD to denote the code obtained by puncturing C in all
coordinates in D. Let C(D) be the set of codewords which are 0 on D. Then the
shortened code of C in all coordinates in D, denoted by CD, is the code obtained
by puncturing the coordinates of C(D) in D. Puncturing a code is equivalent to
shortening the dual code, as explained by the following proposition, whose proof
can be found in [21, Theorem 1.5.7].
Proposition 1. Let C be an [ℓ, k] code over Fq and let D be any set of coordi-
nates of C. Then (CD)⊥ = (C⊥)
D
and (CD)⊥ =
(C⊥)D .
Reed-Muller codes first appeared in print in 1954 and remain “· · · one of
the oldest and best understood families of codes” [29, p. 370]. As stated in [4],
we use RM(d, n) to denote the dth-order Reed-Muller code of length 2n. Each
codeword in RM(d, n) is defined by evaluating an n-variable Boolean function h
of degree at most d at all points in Fn2 . The Reed-Muller codes RM(d, n) have
been shown to be equivalent to primitive cyclic codes (codes of length 2n − 1)
with an overall parity check added [24]. Let α be a primitive element of F2n .
Let P0 = 0 and Pj = α
j−1, where 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n − 1. Then P0, ..., P2n−1 is an
enumeration of the points of the vector space F2n . Under this enumeration, the
Reed-Muller code RM(d, n) of order d in n variables may be written as
RM(d, n) = {(f(P0), · · · , f(P2n−1)) : f ∈ Bn, deg(f) ≤ d} .
We summarize the results on the properties of the Reed-Muller codes in the
following theorem. For the details of proof we refer the reader to [24,29].
Theorem 1. Let n be any positive integer and let 0 ≤ d ≤ n.
(1) The Reed-Muller code RM(d, n) is a binary linear code of dimension
∑d
i=0
(
n
i
)
.
(2) The dual code of RM(d, n) is the code RM(n− d− 1, n).
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2.3 Linear complementary dual codes and self-orthogonal codes
The hull of a linear code C is defined to be Hull(C) = C∩C⊥. When Hull(C) = C,
C is said to be self-orthogonal. In particular, if Hull(C) = C = C⊥, then C is called
a self-dual code. The code C is called a linear complementary dual code (in brief,
an LCD code) if Hull(C) is the zero space. These codes have been extensively
studied recently [8,9,11,23,27,28,35].
For a matrix G, GT denotes the transposed matrix of G. The Gram matrix
of G is defined to be GGT . The Gram matrix of a generator of a linear code
plays an important role in the study of the hulls of linear codes [19,41].
Proposition 2. Let C be an [ℓ, k] linear code over Fq with generator matrix G.
Then
dimFq (Hull(C)) = k − Rank
(
GGT
)
.
In particular, C is LCD (resp. self-orthogonal) if and only if GGT is nonsin-
gular (resp. GGT = 0).
A vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) in F
ℓ
2 is even-like if
∑ℓ
i=1 xi = 0. A binary
code is said to be even-like if it has only even-like codewords. The following
proposition gives a necessary condition for an even-like code being LCD [10].
Proposition 3. Let C be an even-like binary code with parameters [ℓ, k]. If C is
LCD then k is an even integer.
3 Fast algebraic immunity and fast immunity profile
3.1 A new definition of fast algebraic immunity and its consequences
In the literature, different criteria have been proposed to characterize the immu-
nity of Boolean functions against fast algebraic attacks; some of those character-
izations do not define a parameter but a property that should satisfy a Boolean
function to resist to fast algebraic attacks [18,26,36].
Definition 1. Let f be an n-variable Boolean function. We call fast algebraic
immunity of f , denoted by FAI(f), the smallest value taken by deg(g)+deg(f ·g)
when g 6≡ 1 ranges over the set AN c(f). We say that such a g achieves FAI(f).
Remark 1. It has been shown in [14, Theorem 7.2.1] that, for any n-variable
Boolean function f and for every positive integers d and e such that d+ e ≥ n,
there exists g of algebraic degree at most d and h of algebraic degree at most e
such that f ·g = h. It implies that FAI(f) ≤ n. Now, one has deg(f ·g) ≥ deg(g)
if deg(f · g)+deg(g) = FAI(f) (indeed, suppose that deg(f · g) < deg(g) then g
cannot achieve deg(f ·g)+deg(g) = FAI(f), because, denoting h = f ·g, we have
f · h = h and then h 6= 0 and deg(f · h) + deg(h) < deg(f · g) + deg(g)). Hence,
if g achieves FAI(f) then, necessarily, deg(g) ≤ n2 since deg(g) + deg(f · g) =
FAI(f) ≤ n and deg(g) ≤ deg(f · g) implies that deg(g) ≤ n2 .
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Remark 2. In [16,26], the authors proposed different criteria that should satisfy a
Boolean function to be (almost) resistant to fast algebraic attacks. Those criteria
are very similar. Indeed, in [16, Definition 1], it is defined that an n-variable
Boolean function f would be almost optimal resistant against fast algebraic
attacks if, for 1 ≤ e < n2 , deg(f · g) ≥ n − e − 1 whenever deg(g) ≤ e and
f · g 6= 0. In [26, Definition 2], the authors defined perfect algebraic immune
functions as the n-variable Boolean function f such that, for every 1 ≤ e < n2 ,
deg(f · g) ≥ n − e for any n-variable Boolean function g of algebraic degree at
most e.
Observe that the almost optimal resistance defined in [16] is equivalent to
FAI(f) ≥ n − 1 while the perfect algebraic immune functions of [26] are those
such that FAI(f) ≥ n.
We first derive from the definition of FAI an upper bound on the algebraic
degree of Boolean function achieving FAI.
Proposition 4. Let n be a positive integer. Let f be an n-variable function.
Let g an n-variable function achieving FAI(f). Then deg(g) ≤
⌊
FAI(f)
2
⌋
and
deg(f · g) ≥
⌈
FAI(f)
2
⌉
Proof. Let g ∈ AN c(f) achieving FAI(f), that is, deg(g)+ deg(f.g) = FAI(f).
Necessarily deg(f ·g) ≥ deg(g) (see Remark 2). Hence 2 deg(g) ≤ FAI(f), that is,
deg(g) ≤
⌊
FAI(f)
2
⌋
. Thus deg(f · g) = FAI(f)−deg(g) ≥ FAI(f)−
⌊
FAI(f)
2
⌋
=⌈
FAI(f)
2
⌉
.
⊓⊔
In [25], it has been proposed another definition than ours for the fast algebraic
immunity. Indeed, in [25], the authors give the following definition for the fast
algebraic immunity of a Boolean function:
min
(
2AI(f), min
1≤deg(g)<AI(f)
(deg(g) + deg(f · g))
)
. (1)
Remark 3. Using the definition above, an upper bound of fast algebraic immu-
nity of power functions has been established by Mesnager and Cohen [34]. More
precisely, let f(x) = Trn1 (γx
d) where γ ∈ F2n and d is a positive integer. Suppose
that AI(f) ≥
⌈
n
⌊√n⌋
⌉
+ 1. Then
FAI(f) ≤ u⌊√n⌋+ 2
⌈ n
⌊√n⌋
⌉
− 1
where u is the number of runs of 1 in the binary representation of d.
8 S. Mesnager and C. Tang
Note that AN c(f) contains all n-variable Boolean functions g such that 1 ≤
deg(g) < AI(f) because any g of algebraic degree less than AI(f) cannot be an
annihilator of f . Hence
min
1≤deg(g)<AI(f)
(deg(g) + deg(f · g)) ≥ FAI(f).
Furthermore, AN c(f) may contain Boolean function of algebraic degree greater
than or equal to AI(f), that is, {g : Fn2 → F2 | 1 ≤ deg(g) < AI(f)} is
strictly contained in AN c(f). However, (1) is less than FAI(f) if and only only
if 2AI(f) < FAI(f). We are now going to show that the FAI of a Boolean
function or its complement is necessarily less than or equal to (1). To this end,
we first show that the FAI of a function can be bounded from above and below
with the lowest degree of the non-zero annihilators of its complement.
Proposition 5. Let f be a non-zero n-variable Boolean function. Then
LDA(1 + f) + 1 ≤ FAI(f) ≤ 2LDA(1 + f).
Proof. Note that g 6∈ AN c(f) says only that f ·g 6= 0. Hence, AN c(f) contains all
the non-zero annihilators of 1+f since f ·g = g for every g ∈ AN(1+f). Now, if g
is an non-zero annihilator of 1+f then f ·g = g proving that FAI(f) ≤ 2 deg(g)
from which we deduce that FAI(f) ≤ 2LDA(1 + f).
On the other hand, observe that, if f · g 6= 0, then f · g is an non-zero
annihilator of 1 + f . Thus deg(g) + deg(f · g) ≥ 1 + LDA(1 + f). ⊓⊔
Remark 4. The lower bound and the upper bound in Proposition 5 are achieved.
Indeed, let f be an n-variable Boolean function whose support strictly contains
the support of an affine Boolean function l. Then fl = l which implies that
LDA(1 + f) = 1 since (1 + f) · l = 0. Thus deg(l) + deg(f · l) = 2 deg(l) = 2 =
LDA(1 + f) + 1 = 2LDA(1 + f).
Proposition 5 says that, for any n-variable Boolean function, FAI(f) ≤
2LDA(1+f). Thus, if LDA(1+f) > LDA(f), FAI(1+f) ≤ 2LDA(f) = 2AI(f)
while FAI(f) ≤ 2AI(f) = 2LDA(1 + f) if LDA(1 + f) ≤ LDA(f). Summariz-
ing:
Corollary 1. Let f be an n-variable Boolean function. Then
min(FAI(f), FAI(1 + f)) ≤ 2AI(f).
Based on this observation, an extension of fast algebraic immunity is given by
Definition 2.
Definition 2. Let f be an n-variable Boolean function. The FAI of f is the
minimum value between FAI(f) and FAI(1 + f):
FAI(f) = min(FAI(f), FAI(1 + f)).
A direct consequence of Proposition 5 is then that the FAI of an n-variable
function is less than or equal to (1). But above, one deduces from Proposition 5.
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Proposition 6. Let f be an n-variable Boolean function. Then
min (LDA(f) + 1, LDA(1 + f) + 1) ≤ FAI(f) ≤ 2AI(f).
Another property of FAI is that it is invariant under affine transformations
like the standard algebraic immunity.
Proposition 7. Let f be an n-variable Boolean function and A an automor-
phism of Fn2 . Then FAI(f ◦A) = FAI(f).
Proof. Note that {deg(g)+deg(f ·g) | g ∈ AN c(f)} = {deg(g◦A)+deg(f ◦A·g◦
A) | g ∈ AN c(f)}. Observe now, that f ·g 6= 0 if and only if f ◦A ·g ◦A 6= 0, that
is, g ∈ AN c(f) if and only if g◦A 6∈ AN c(f ◦A). Thus FAI(f) = FAI(f ◦A). ⊓⊔
One can extend Proposition 7 to FAI.
Proposition 8. Let f be an n-variable Boolean function and A an automor-
phism of Fn2 . Then FAI(f ◦A) = FAI(f).
3.2 Fast immunity profile
Set MULk(f) = {f · g | deg(g) ≤ k} and µk(f) = mindegMULk(f), where
mindeg denotes the minimum degree of the non-zeros elements of the set. Clearly
(µk(f)1≤k≤n is a non-increasing sequence of integers. We shall call it the fast
immunity profile of f . Note that MULk(f ◦A) = {f ◦A · g | deg(g ◦A) ≤ k} =
{f · h | deg(h) ≤ k} ◦ A = MULk(f) ◦ A for every affine automorphism of Fn2 ,
proving that
Lemma 1. Let f be an n-variable Boolean function and A an automorphism of
F
n
2 . Then µk(f) = µk(f ◦A) for every 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
We now show that the algebraic immunity and the fast algebraic immunity
of f can be expressed by means of the immunity profile. We first recall the
relationship between the annihilators of a function f and the multiples of f +1.
Proposition 9. Let f be an n-variable Boolean function. Then
LDA(f) = min
1≤k≤n
µk(f + 1).
Furthermore, if k ≥ LDA(f), µk(f + 1) = LDA(f).
Proof. For any integer k ranging from 1 to n, we have µk(1+f) = mindegMULk(1+
f) ≥ LDA(f) since every nonzero element of MULk(1 + f) is a non-zero anni-
hilator of f . It follows that min1≤k≤n µk(f + 1) ≥ LDA(f).
Conversely, let g be an annihilator of f of algebraic degree LDA(f). Then
one has (1 + f) · g = g and thus µLDA(f)(1 + f) ≤ LDA(f) implying that
min1≤k≤n µk(f + 1) ≤ LDA(f). Consequently, LDA(f) = min1≤k≤n µk(f + 1).
Furthermore, note that (µk(1 + f))1≤k≤n is a nonincreasing sequence of in-
tegers. Hence, since µLDA(f)(1 + f) ≤ LDA(f), one has necessarily µk(1 + f) =
LDA(f) when k ≥ LDA(f). ⊓⊔
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Recalling that AI(f) = min(LDA(f), LDA(1 + f)), we deduce:
Proposition 10. Let f be an n-variable Boolean function. Then
AI(f) = min( min
1≤k≤n
µk(f + 1), min
1≤k≤n
µk(f))
Proposition 11. Let f be an n-variable Boolean function. Then
FAI(f) = min
1≤k≤n
(k + µk(f)).
Proof. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n be arbitrary. By definition, µk(f) is the lowest algebraic
degree of all nonzero elements of MULk(f). Thus, for g 6= 0, deg(g) = k, f · g 6=
0, one has deg(f · g) + deg(g) ≥ µk(f) + k. Hence, one gets that FAI(f) ≥
min1≤k≤n(k + µk(f)). Conversely, let 1 ≤ j ≤ n be such that j + µj(f) =
min1≤k≤n(k+µk(f)). Let h be a function with deg(h) = j achieving µj(f) (such
that µj(f) = deg(f · h) and f · h 6= 0). Then deg(h) + deg(f · h) = j + µj(f) ≥
FAI(f). ⊓⊔
4 Fast algebraic immunity, approximation and
concatenation of functions
4.1 Fast algebraic immunity and approximation of functions
In [40] the algebraic complement of a Boolean function and its algebraic immu-
nity have been studied.
Definition 3. Given a Boolean function f defined on Fn2 , the algebraic comple-
ment of f , denoted by f c, is the function that contains all the monomials that
are not in the algebraic normal form of f .
In [40, Theorem 2], the authors have shown that the algebraic immunities of
a Boolean function and its algebraic complement are close:
|AI(f)−AI(f c)| ≤ 1.
Let us denote by δ0 the indicator of the singleton {0}. It is well-known and
easily checked that the algebraic normal form of δ0 equals
∑
I⊆{1,...,n}
∏
i∈I xi.
The algebraic complement of a function f is then the function f + δ0. Since the
algebraic immunity is invariant under affine transformations, there is no reason
to privilege δ0 rather than any other indicator of a singleton δa (except that the
ANF of the algebraic complement is nicely simple). Moreover, functions f + δa,
a ∈ Fn2 , are all functions at Hamming distance 1 from f , and it seems natural
to consider more generally functions at low Hamming distance from f . A nice
observation has been made in [39]: if a function is at low Hamming distance from
a low algebraic degree function, then it is weak against fast algebraic attacks.
We show now that if a function is at low Hamming distance from a low algebraic
immunity function, then it is weak against (standard) algebraic attacks:
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Proposition 12. let k and d be two positive integers. Let f be any n-variable
Boolean function such that AI(f) = k. Let δ be any Boolean function such that
wH(δ) < min(2
n−k, 2d+1 − 1). Then:
|AI(f + δ)−AI(f)| ≤ d.
Proof. There exists by hypothesis a nonzero annihilator g of f or of f +1 whose
algebraic degree is k. Let a0 be any element such that δ(a0) = 0 and g(a0) = 1.
Such an element exists because the Hamming weight of g is larger than or equal
to 2n−k.
Write Supp(δ) = {x ∈ Fn2 : δ(x) = 1} and w = wH(δ). Let the points of
Supp(δ) be a1, · · · , aw. Let π be the linear mapping given by
π : RM(d, n) −→ Fw+12
(h(x))x∈Fn2 7→ (h(ai))wi=0.
We next claim that the mapping π is surjective. Suppose the claim was false.
Then the image of π lies in a hyperplane of Fw+12 and thus we could find a
non-zero vector (cai)
w
i=0 ∈ Fw+12 such that ca0h(a0) + · · · cawh(aw) = 0 for
any n-variable Boolean function h of degree at most d. It follows that the
vector (cx)x∈Fn2 defined by cx =


cai , if x = ai
0, otherwise
belongs to the dual code
RM(d, n)⊥ = RM(n − d − 1, n) of RM(d, n). Note that the weight of the code-
word (cx)x∈Fn2 of RM(n − d − 1, n) is less or equal to w + 1, which contradicts
the facts that the minimum distance of RM(n − d − 1, n) is at least 2d+1 and
w + 1 ≤ 2d+1 − 1. Thus π is a surjective mapping. In particular, there exists
a polynomial h of degree at most d such that h(a0) = 1 and h(ai) = 0 for
1 ≤ i ≤ w. We have then (f + δ) · gh = 0 or (f + 1 + δ) · gh = 0 and gh is an
annihilator of f + δ or of f + 1 + δ and it is nonzero since (gh)(a0) = 1. This
implies that AI(f + δ) ≤ AI(f) + d and applying this result to f + δ instead of
f gives AI(f) ≤ AI(f + δ) + d, which completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Note that this result and the result from [39] mentioned above are comple-
mentary of each other since the condition of being at low Hamming distance
from a low algebraic immunity function is a weaker assumption than being at
low Hamming distance from a function of low algebraic degree, and moreover
the weakness against standard algebraic attacks is still worse than the weakness
against fast algebraic attacks (because when they apply, algebraic attacks are
more efficient than fast algebraic attacks), but the result from [39] still applies for
functions at low Hamming distance from a function whose algebraic degree is not
necessarily low, but is not high either; indeed it says that if wH(δ) <
∑d
i=0
(
n
i
)
and f has algebraic degree k then FAI(f + δ) ≤ k + 2d.
Let us now investigate if FAI(f) and FAI(f c) are close or not. To this end,
we shall need the following Lemma.
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Lemma 2. Let f 6= δ0 be an n-variable Boolean function. Let g achieving
FAI(f). Then there exists an n-variable affine function l vanishing at 0 such
that f · g · l 6= 0.
Proof. Suppose that for every n-variable affine Boolean function l vanishing at
0, f · g · l = 0. Then, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, f · g · li = 0 where li(x1, . . . , xn) = xi,
that is, f · g = (1 + li)hi for some n-variable Boolean function hi. Therefore,
f · g = δ0 =
∏n
i=1 li. Now, FAI(f) = deg(f · g) + deg(g) = n + deg(g) ≤ n.
Hence, g = 1 contradicting f 6= δ0. ⊓⊔
We begin with showing.
Proposition 13. Let f be an n-variable Boolean function. Suppose f 6= δ0 and
f c 6= δ0. Then
|FAI(f c)− FAI(f)| ≤ 2.
Proof. According to Proposition 11, FAI(f) = min1≤k≤n(k+µk(f)). Let k ≥ 1
achieving FAI(f): k+µk(f) = FAI(f). Let g achieving µk(f): deg(f ·g) = µk(f).
Now, observe that, for any n-variable Boolean function p,
f c · p = f · p+ δ0 · p =
{
f · p if p(0) = 0
f · p+ δ0 if p(0) = 1
But in all cases, for any n-variable affine Boolean function l vanishing at 0,
f · g · l = f c · g · l since δ0 · l = 0. According to Lemma 2, there exists l such that
f · g · l = f c · g · l 6= 0. Then
FAI(f c) ≤ deg(f c · g · l) + deg(g · l)
≤ deg(f c · g) + deg(g) + 2 = FAI(f) + 2.
Now, since the algebraic complement of f c is f itself. One can exchange the role
of f and its algebraic complement f c in the above arguments and prove
FAI(f) ≤ FAI(f c) + 2.
⊓⊔
Remark 5. Following the above proof, if the n-Boolean function g achieving
FAI(f) vansihes at 0. Then, one has FAI(f c) ≤ deg(f c · g) + deg(g) = deg(f ·
g) + deg(g) = FAI(f). Therefore, if FAI(f c) is also achieved by an n-variable
Boolean function vanishing at 0 then, FAI(f c) ≥ FAI(f). Therefore, we might
have FAI(f) = FAI(f c) for some subclasses of n-variable Boolean functions.
Remark 6. Observe that the condition f 6= δ0 is not restrictive since AI(δ0) = 1
(δ0 · l = 0 if l(0) = 0 and deg(l) = 1).
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4.2 Fast algebraic immunity and concatenation of Boolean functions
A classical secondary constructions of Boolean functions from Boolean functions
in lower dimension is the following.
Definition 4. Let f0 and f1 be two (n − 1)-variable Boolean functions. The
concatenation of f0 with f1 is the n-variable Boolean function defined, for x =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fn2 , by
f(x1, . . . , xn) = (xn + 1)f0(x1, . . . , xn−1)
+ xnf1(x1, . . . , xn−1)
=
{
f0(x1, . . . , xn−1) if xn = 0
f1(x1, . . . , xn−1) if xn = 1.
(2)
Any n-variable Boolean function of algebraic degree k can be written
g(x1, . . . , xn) = (xn + 1)g0(x1, . . . , xn−1)
+ xng1(x1, . . . , xn−1)
(3)
where g0 and g1 are (n− 1)-Boolean function and
deg(g) = max(deg(g0), deg(g0 + g1) + 1).
Observe that, the product f · g, where f is given by (2) and g is given by (3), is
f(x1, . . . , xn)g(x1, . . . , xn)
= (xn + 1)f0(x1, . . . , xn−1)g0(x1, . . . , xn−1)
+ xnf1(x1, . . . , xn−1)g1(x1, . . . , xn−1).
Hence
deg(f · g) + deg(g) = max
(
deg(f0g0) + deg(g0),
deg(f0g0) + deg(g0 + g1) + 1,
deg(f0g0 + f1g1) + deg(g0) + 1,
deg(f0g0 + f1g1) + deg(g0 + g1) + 2
)
.
(4)
Based on this observation, we prove
Proposition 14. Let n be a positive integer greater than 1. Let f0 and f1 be
two (n− 1)-variable Boolean functions. Let f be the n-variable Boolean function
obtained by concatenating f0 with f1. Then
FAI(f) ≥ min(FAI(f0), FAI(f1) + 1),
and
FAI(f) ≤ min(FAI(f0), FAI(f1)) + 2.
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Proof. Let g an n-variable Boolean function achieving FAI(f): FAI(f) = deg(f ·
g) + deg(g) and f · g 6= 0. This Boolean function can be written as (3). Since
f · g 6= 0, either f0 · g0 6= 0 either f1 · g1 6= 0. If f0 · g0 6= 0 then, according to (4),
FAI(f) ≥ deg(f0g0) + deg(g0) ≥ FAI(f0). If f0g0 = 0 and f1g1 6= 0, then (4)
rewrites as
deg(f · g) + deg(g) = max
(
deg(f1g1) + deg(g0) + 1,
deg(f1g1) + deg(g0 + g1) + 2
)
.
The result follows then from nothing that
– either deg(g0 + g1) < deg(g1), wich implies deg(g0) = deg(g1) and thus
FAI(f) ≥ deg(f1g1) + deg(g0) + 1 ≥ FAI(f1) + 1,
– either deg(g0 + g1) ≥ deg(g1) which implies that FAI(f) ≥ deg(f1g1) +
deg(g1) + 2 ≥ FAI(f1) + 2 ≥ FAI(f) + 1.
Conversely, if we take g0 achieving FAI(f0) and g1 = 0 in (4), then, we get
FAI(f) ≤ deg(g) = deg(f0g0) + deg(g0) + 2 = FAI(f0) + 2.
Likewise, if we take g1 achieving FAI(f1) and f0 = 0 then,
FAI(f) ≤ deg(g) = deg(f1g1) + deg(g1) + 2 = FAI(f1) + 2.
⊓⊔
In [12], the authors have considered such construction to design Boolean func-
tions suitable for the filter model of pseudo-random generator. More precisely,
they have considered the particular case of the concatenation of an (n − 1)-
variable Boolean function f with its complement 1 + f to 1. Let us denote f¯
such a concatenation:
f¯(x1, . . . , xn) = xn + f(x1, · · · , xn−1)
= (xn + 1)f(x1, · · · , xn−1)
+ xn(1 + f(x1, · · · , xn−1)).
(5)
We then deduce from Proposition 14
Corollary 2. Let f be an (n− 1)-variable Boolean function. Let f¯ be defined by
(5). Then
min(FAI(f), FAI(1 + f) + 1) ≤ FAI(f¯) ≤ FAI(f) + 2.
Now, note that 1 + f¯ is the concatenation of 1 + f with f :
1 + f¯(x1, . . . , xn) = 1 + xn + f(x1, · · · , xn−1)
= (xn + 1)(1 + f(x1, · · · , xn−1))
+ xnf(x1, · · · , xn−1).
Therefore
Corollary 3. Let f be an (n− 1)-variable Boolean function. Let f¯ be defined by
(5). Then
FAI(f) ≤ FAI(f¯) ≤ FAI(f) + 2.
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5 Fast algebraic immunity and LCD codes
In this section we shall establish the relation between fast algebraic immunity,
perfect algebraic immune functions, punctured Reed-Muller codes and binary
LCD codes.
The link between the algebraic immunity of Boolean functions and the di-
mensions of punctured Reed-Muller codes is described in the following.
Proposition 15. Let e be a positive integer. Let f be an n-variable Boolean
function and let D be its support. Then the algebraic immunity of f is greater
than e if and only if the dimensions of the two punctured Reed-Muller codes
RM(e, n)D and RM(e, n)D are both equal to dimF2 (RM(e, n)).
Proof. Let AI(f) > e. Assume by way of contradiction,
dimF2
(
RM(e, n)D
)
< dimF2 (RM(e, n)) . (6)
Consider the linear transformation ResD from RM(e, n) to the punctured code
RM(e, n)D defined by
(g(x))Fn2 7→ (g(x))x∈D.
By assumption in (6), there exists a nonzero function g ∈ Bn of degree at most
e such that ResD(g) = (g(x))x∈D = 0. Then fg = 0, contrary to AI(f) > e.
Hence dimF2
(
RM(e, n)D
)
= dimF2 (RM(e, n)) . By a similar argument, we can
show that dimF2
(
RM(e, n)D
)
= dimF2 (RM(e, n)) .
As for the converse, suppose the assertion is false. Then we could find a
nonzero function g of degree at most e such that fg = 0 or (1 + f)g = 0. By
symmetry, one can assume that fg = 0. We then have ResD(g) = (g(x))x∈D is
the all zeros codeword of RM(e, n)D. We conclude that the linear transformation
ResD is surjective but not injective. This clearly forces dimF2
(
RM(e, n)D
)
<
dimF2 (RM(e, n)) , a contradiction. Therefore AI(f) > e. ⊓⊔
Given a nonzero Boolean function f , let
〈
1wt(f)
〉
denote the binary code
generated by the all-ones vector 1wt(f) of length wt(f). To treat fast algebraic
immunity of Boolean functions, we need to invoke punctured Reed-Muller codes.
Lemma 3. Let e, e′ and n be positive integers. Let f be an n-variable nonzero
Boolean function and let D be its support. Then the intersection of RM(e, n)D
and
(
RM(e′, n)D
)⊥
is included in
〈
1wt(f)
〉
if and only if deg(fg) ≥ n− e′ holds
for any n-variable nonzero Boolean function g ∈ AN c(f)\(1 +AN(f)) of degree
at most e, where 1 +AN(f) = {1 + h : h ∈ AN(f)}.
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Proof. By Proposition 1,
(
RM(e′, n)D
)⊥
=
(
RM(e′, n)⊥
)
D
.
Invoking Part (5) of Theorem 1, we get
(
RM(e′, n)D
)⊥
= RM(n− e′ − 1, n)D. (7)
Let us first prove the only if part, so let us suppose that RM(e, n)D ∩(
RM(e′, n)D
)⊥
⊆ 〈1wt(f)〉. If there existed a function g ∈ AN c(f)\(1 +AN(f))
such that deg(g) ≤ e and deg(fg) ≤ n− e′ − 1, we would have
(g(x))x∈D ∈ RM(e, n)D
and
(g(x)f(x))x∈D ∈ RM(n− e′ − 1, n)D.
Then, taking g ∈ AN c(f) and supp(f) = D into account, one sees that the
nonzero codeword (g(x))x∈D is not equal to 1wt(f) and lies in the intersection of
the punctured code RM(e, n)D and the shortened code RM(n−e′−1, n)D. From
(7), we deduce that RM(e, n)D ∩
(
RM(e′, n)D
)⊥
is not included in
〈
1wt(f)
〉
, a
contradiction. Hence the proof of the only if part is concluded.
For the converse, suppose the assertion of the lemma is false. Then we could
find a function g ∈ AN c(f) of degree at most e such that
(g(x))x∈D ∈
(
RM(e, n)D ∩
(
RM(e′, n)D
)⊥)
\ 〈1wt(f)〉 .
Thus, we can apply (7) to conclude that 1 + g 6∈ AN(f) and
(g(x)f(x))x∈D = (g(x))x∈D ∈ RM(n− e′ − 1, n)D.
We thus get deg(gf) ≤ n− e′− 1, a contradiction. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. Let f be an n-variable nonzero Boolean function and let D be its
support. Then 1wt(f) 6∈
(
RM(e′, n)D
)⊥
if and only if deg(f) ≥ n− e′.
Proof. By (7), 1wt(f) 6∈
(
RM(e′, n)D
)⊥
if and only if 1wt(f) 6∈ RM(n−e′−1, n)D.
The desired conclusion then follows from the definition of RM(n−e′−1, n)D. ⊓⊔
The following theorem provides a characterization of fast algebraic immu-
nity of n-variable higher degree Boolean functions by means of punctured Reed-
Muller codes.
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Theorem 2. Let s be a positive integer. Let f be an n-variable nonzero Boolean
function with deg(f) ≥ s − 1 and let D be its support. Then the fast alge-
braic immunity of f is greater than or equal to s if and only if RM(e, n)D ∩(
RM(e+ n− s, n)D
)⊥
= {0} holds for any 1 ≤ e ≤ n.
Proof. Let f be an n-variable Boolean function with FAI(f) ≥ s. By the defi-
nition of fast algebraic immunity, we have
deg(g) + deg(gf) ≥ s for any g ∈ AN c(f) \ {1}.
Now, as then, we can assert that deg(gf) ≥ s−deg(g) ≥ n−(e+n−s) for any g ∈
AN c(f) with 1 ≤ deg(g) ≤ e. Therefore RM(e, n)D ∩
(
RM(e+ n− s, n)D
)⊥
⊆〈
1wt(f)
〉
holds for any 1 ≤ e ≤ n by Lemma 3. As deg(f) ≥ s−1 ≥ n−(e+n−s)
we have RM(e, n)D ∩
(
RM(e + n− s, n)D
)⊥
= {0} from Lemma 4.
Conversely, assume that for any 1 ≤ e ≤ n one has
RM(e, n)D ∩
(
RM(e + n− s, n)D
)⊥
= {0} .
Suppose the theorem were false. Then we could find a Boolean function g ∈
AN c(f) \ {1} such that deg(g) + deg(gf) < s. It follows that deg(gf) < n −
(e+ n− s) ≤ deg(f) and g(1 + f) 6≡ 0, where e = deg(g). Lemma 3 now implies
that RM(e, n)D∩
(
RM(e + n− s, n)D
)⊥
is included in
〈
1wt(f)
〉
, a contradiction.
This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
The following theorem gives a characterization of perfect algebraic immune
functions using the LCD-ness of the punctured codes of Reed-Muller codes by
deleting the coordinates outside the supports of the Boolean functions.
Theorem 3. Let f be an n-variable nonzero Boolean function and let D be its
support. Then f is a perfect algebraic immune function if and only if RM(e, n)D
is an LCD code for any 1 ≤ e ≤ n.
Proof. Let f be a perfect algebraic immune function. The perfect algebraic
immune function f has degree at least n − 1 (see [36]). By Theorem 2 and
FAI(f) = n, RM(e, n)D is LCD for any 1 ≤ e ≤ n.
Conversely, suppose that RM(e, n)D is an LCD code for any 1 ≤ e ≤ n. The
desired conclusion then follows from Theorem 2 and Lemma 4. This completes
the proof. ⊓⊔
The following corollary has been proved in [26] and we give an alternative
proof of it based on coding theory.
Corollary 4. Let f be an n-variable perfect algebraic immune function. Then
n = 2τ + 1 when wt(f) is even and n = 2τ when wt(f) is odd, where τ is a
positive integer.
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Proof. Let f be a perfect algebraic immune function and let D be its support.
Then AI(f) ≥ n/2 by Corollary 1. Theorem 3 shows that RM(e, n)D is an LCD
code for any 1 ≤ e ≤ (n−1)/2. Combining Proposition 15 with Theorem 1 yields
dimF2
(
RM(e, n)D
)
=
∑e
i=0
(
n
i
)
. Since 1wt(f) lies in RM(e, n)
D,
(
RM(e, n)D
)⊥
is an even-like LCD code with dimension wt(f) −∑ei=0 (ni). We conclude from
Proposition 3 that wt(f) ≡ ∑ei=0 (ni) (mod 2) for any 1 ≤ e ≤ (n − 1)/2. This
clearly forces
n ≡ wt(f) + 1 (mod 2) and
(
n
e
)
≡ 0 (mod 2), (8)
where 2 ≤ e ≤ (n− 1)/2.
Let us first consider the case wt(f) ≡ 0 (mod 2). Write n = 2τ +∑τ−1i=0 ai2i.
We have a0 = 1, because n ≡ 1 (mod 2). If there existed an ai such that ai = 1
and 1 ≤ i ≤ τ − 1, we would have 2 ≤ 2i ≤ (n− 1)/2 and (n2i) ≡ 1 (mod 2) by
Lucas’ Theorem, contrary to (8). Hence ai = 0 and n = 2
τ + 1.
Similar arguments apply to the case wt(f) ≡ 1 (mod 2). Then we have n =
2τ in this case.This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
As a corollary of Proposition 15 and Theorem 3, we have the following, which
provides a way of constructing LCD codes via perfect algebraic immune function.
Corollary 5. Let f be an n-variable perfect algebraic immune function and let
D be its support. Let e be an integer with 1 ≤ e ≤ (n− 1)/2. Then RM(e, n)D is
an LCD code of dimension
∑e
i=0
(
n
i
)
.
Plugging all the families of perfect algebraic immune functions presented in
[5] and [26] into Corollary 5 will produce a lot of binary LCD codes.
Corollary 6. Let n = 2τ or 2τ + 1. Let D be a subset of F2n given by
D =


{αℓ, αℓ+1, · · · , αℓ+2τ−1−1}, if n = 2τ + 1,
{0, αℓ, αℓ+1, · · · , αℓ+2τ−1−1}, if n = 2τ ,
where α is a primitive element of F2n and ℓ is an integer. Then RM(e, n)
D is
an LCD code of dimension
∑e
i=0
(
n
i
)
for any 1 ≤ e ≤ (n− 1)/2.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated some problems on fast algebraic immunity of
Boolean functions and LCD codes. More specifically, we pushed further the gen-
eral study of the fast algebraic immunity and investigated its behavior in particu-
lar for certain families of Boolean functions. We have also introduced the related
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fast immunity profile and showed that the algebraic immunity and the fast alge-
braic immunity of a Boolean function can be expressed by means of its immunity
profile. In addition, we provided new characterizations of perfect algebraic im-
mune functions by means of the LCD-ness of punctured Reed-Muller codes. We
also contributed to the current work on binary LCD codes (which are the most
important codes regarding its applications in armoring implementations against
side-channel attacks and fault non-invasive attacks) by constructing a large class
of binary LCD codes from perfect algebraic immune functions. The results show
a novel application of perfect algebraic immune functions in addition to their
contribution in symmetric cryptography. This offers a new direction of research
in this context.
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